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Abstract: The paper builds on the case of the design and implementation of the National
Information System for School Buildings in Italy. The project is one of digitalization of
the public sector and involve several layers of territorial governments (the State
Department for Education, Regional and local governments) and ICT experts, and is
becoming a tool for policy making in the field. Nonetheless, the programme was initially
designed with a top-down approach immediately stuck. Its effective implementation
only took place some years later by downsizing policy design and allowing Regions to
implement those digital solutions which, in the meanwhile, had been designed and
implemented from the bottom-up. The paper draws from the case study theoretical
considerations about the importance of where policy learning happens and the
strategies that policy makers may adopt in case of policy failure in order to re-establish
the conditions for effectiveness.
Response to Reviewers: Letter to the Editor
Dear Editor,
We are glad for the opportunity we have to resubmit our paper. We are aware that we
received major remarks and by consequence we deeply restructured the paper, in
particular concerning the theoretical section and its connections with the empirics.
These is a summary of the main changes we made and that are highlighted in bold
throughout the main file:
Major points.
1.Section 2 has been unfolded in two new section. New section 2 has been completely
re-written and now explicitly focus the theoretical argument of our paper, which
addresses the issues of the loci of policy learning. New section 3, instead provide a
succinct review of the literature on the implementation of e-government solutions.
2.Section 4 (previously section 3) discusses more in detail the methodological
standpoint, explaining the case selection and the unit of analysis (the implementation
Powered by Editorial Manager® and ProduXion Manager® from Aries Systems Corporation
process of a certain policy programme.
3.The role of the national level of government has been described more in detail. To
this regard we provided new empirical evidences thanks to a new interview to the
managing director of the School infrastructure’s task force of the Presidency of the
Council.
4.Conclusion has been partly re-written and made more coherent with the main
argument of the paper.
Minor points
1.Documents analysed have been quoted and included among the references.
2.New empirical finding has been added, in particular with an Interview released by the
Presidency of the Council responsible for the programme.
3.We slightly changed the Article title, to make it more close to the main argument of
the paper.
Response to Reviewer 1
Reviewer 1 raised four major points. The first and the second deal with the fact that
both the failure of the first national programme and the emergence of successful
solution from the bottom up are not “unexpected” phenomena. To this he stressed the
fact that the paper omit to explain why successful local solutions had been designed in
certain Region and not in others. The third remark was about the changed role of the
national government, while the fourth stressed the existence of possible alternative
explanations to learning by bargaining for the diffusion of the Toscana’s solution.
Also in reason of other issues raised by reviewers 2 and 3 concerning the theoretical
framework and its consistency, we decided to deeply restructure the paper. Major
changes have been highlighted in bold. Former section 2 has been divided into two
separate sections. New section 2 deals with the theoretical argument the paper aims to
support and has been written ex novo. In this section we focus more directly to our
argument which is twofold:
a. the importance of where learning mechanisms happen as a crucial feature for the
understanding of multi-level policy programme and, consequently,
b. the relevance of “governance learning”, i.e. the fact that actors learning is not
confined to the content of the policy, but also to procedural and governmental issues.
We discussed this point in light of the recent literature on the theme. Now the
connection with the Dunlop-Radaelli typology has slightly changed because we argue –
and then we try to empirically trace – that the localization of policy learning has an
impact on problem tractability and actor certification, and in particular we discussed
how this latter proved to be decisive for the eventual success of the National Register
programme. In new section 3, we critically reviewed the literature on e-government with
particular reference to implementation issues, highlighting how such programmes
entail a relevant role for governance issues which cannot be simply reduced to
centralization vs. decentralization strategies.
With regards to the point raised, the new structure of the paper makes us possible to
react to the four points in this way:
Point 1: We do not think particularly crucial that the failure of the first round of the
National Programme was to some extent foreseeable. The very important thing is why
it failed and this has to do with the fact that implementers (the Ministry and the ICT
company, Engineering) – albeit technically well equipped – were too far from the place
of actual implementation and with street level bureaucrats from whom relevant
information about the system’ contents and implementation depend.
Point 2: We do not think this point is really an issue for our paper. Although interesting,
it is not our ambition to explain why effective solutions have been developed in the two
Regions considered and not in others with similar organizational capacity. Honestly, it
could be also questionable that such a research question could be really answered
because the role of idiosyncratic factors in explaining technological innovation is
renowned and might overestimate factors such as “organizational capacity”, which are
often attributed to the whole organization and fail to grasp micro-level dynamics (the
availability of a specific knowledge, of an actor playing a director role, etc.).
Incidentally, we documented how the two solutions have been formulated into two very
different settings, more hierarchical in Piemonte’s case, more loosely-coupled in the
other. This testify that organizational feature might not per se explain the rise of
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innovation, but, as we tried to describe, can have impact in the diffusion phase.
Point 3: We absolutely agree on the fact that the national level of government did not
disappear, but it changed its approach, and this represents by the way one of the
clearer indicators that a “governance learning” did happen and is the factor that more
than others account for the conversion of a policy failure into a success. In the
empirical sections, and namely in section 7, we emphasized such a role with new
insights, also taken from a recent interview released by the chief of the School
Infrastructures Task Force, which is part of the Presidency of the Council.
Point 4: We do not think that learning by bargaining and rational choice are to any
extent in contrast. As argued by Dunlop and Radaelli in several contributes, policy
learning fits the most diverse paradigms in the social science. The diffusion of the
Tuscan system did occur because of the emergence of market incentives both on the
supply side (the Pisa’s task force which turned into a limited company, Soluxioni, that
per se testify a kind of learning, of course interested…) and the demand side, because
the other Regions found this solution cheaper and more feasible.
Response to Reviewer 2
Reviewer 2 deeply criticised our article. Mainly he/she found the conceptual framework
flawed and inconsistent. Besides, he/she raised specific points: the connection
between theory and empirics is lacking; the methodology underdeveloped; the typology
of learning not connected to the main argument and not developed; cognitive drivers
mentioned but not discussed; the empirical section is poor.
Before we go into the details of the changes made to our paper, we anticipate that we
agree on three out of the five issues raised, and namely: the theoretical under-
development, the methodological under-development and the lack of reference to
cognitive drivers. It is also true that the typology of learning has not been properly
used, but for reason we discuss in a while, we decided to drop it, and address the
issues raised by the Dunlop-Radaelli from a different angle. Rather, we disagree on the
fact that the empirical section is severely underdeveloped. It surely had problems but it
is grounded on interviews with most of the actual policy makers and we think that the
findings, after this round of revision, are robust and convincing.
Thus, to reply to the issues raised by Reviewer 2 concerning the theoretical framework
and its consistency with the empirics, we decided to deeply restructure the paper.
Major changes have been highlighted in bold. Former section 2 has been divided into
two separate sections. New section 2 deals with the theoretical argument the paper
aims to support and has been written ex novo. In this section we focus more directly to
our argument which is twofold:
a.the importance of where learning mechanisms happen as a crucial feature for the
understanding of multi-level policy programme and, consequently,
b.the relevance of “governance learning”, i.e. the fact that actors learning is not
confined to the content of the policy, but also to procedural and governmental issues.
We discussed this points in light of the recent literature on the theme. Now, the
connection with the Dunlop-Radaelli typology has slightly changed because we argue –
and then we try to empirically trace – that the localization of policy learning has an
impact on problem tractability and actor certification, and in particular we discussed
how this latter proved to be decisive for the eventual success of the National Register
programme. In new section 3, we critically reviewed the literature on e-government with
particular reference to implementation process, highlighting how such programmes
entail a relevant role for governance issues which cannot be simply reduced to
centralization vs. decentralization strategies.
We also improved the empirical section, partially restructuring section 7 to give more
emphasis to the role played by actors at the national level in coordinating an
implementation based on the diffusion of locally-developed solutions. To account for
this outcome, in the revised version of the paper we singled out more clearly two
factors:
a.The learning of national administrations essentially concerning the governance
framework of the programme
b.The diffusion of the Toscana’s solution as a case of learning by bargaining in a
quasi-market situation (anyhow a de facto market created by the incentives posed by
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the State).
The b. point deserves attention in order to address the Reviewer’s last remark, which
suggested the opportunity to focus only on the Tuscan solution. To this regards we
believe that holding both the solution is one of the strength of our paper from the
empirical point of view, with important implications for theory development. The
success of the Tuscan solution relies on cheaper management services and higher
flexibility. These feature in turn, are directly related to the governance arrangement of
both the local policy sub-systems. We thus believe these findings not only contributed
to the literature on policy learning, but also addresses the governance issues
concerning the implementation of e-government programmes which for sure
represents a rising issue in contemporary administrative and policy sciences.
Considering the methodological parts, the paper has been based on the longitudinal
reconstruction of a program implementation, focused on the analysis of the relations
between actors’ interactions and the learning mechanisms able to explain the policy
outcomes (positive, neutral, negative implementation). This within case study has been
selected following a theoretical orientation, as representative of the different actors'
roles and relations along the different steps of the multi-level process (it has been
selected following not a distribution, but its diversity – Rohlfing 2012). The case is part
of a more comprehensive research on the implementation of e-Government
programmes in Italy.
In this integrated version, we reinforced the relations between the hypothesis (learning
depending on the ‘where’ the effective relationships among experts and policymakers
can be developed, especially considering the case of e-Government programmes;
often the local venues with some resources - e.g. experts availability, policy
entrepreneurs, etc. - deploy the opportune setting, better than central venues) and the
collected evidences.
Minor points
The involvement of the Regione Emilia Romagna. We conducted an interview with the
regional project manager because this Region has been one of the first to adopt the
Tuscan solution, before the national incentives framework, and the sole to issue a
competitive tender for the management services. These could be interpreted as proxy
of an office with high skills (by the way increased by the earthquake management) we
needed to select an interviewee among the Regions that adopted the Register
borrowing from others experience.
Document consulted has been included in the references and quoted throughout the
text.
Response to Reviewer 3
Reviewer 3 raised basically three major critical remarks to our paper. The first concern
the theoretical framework which is not coherently developed and not always matching
the empirics. The second issue concern the unit of the analysis, which is not clear. The
third issue concern the existence of potential alternative explanation to learning for our
outcomes.
Overall, we agree on all the three points raised and we worked to improve the paper
accordingly. Major changes have been highlighted in bold.
Thus, to reply to the issues raised by Reviewer 3 concerning the theoretical framework
and its consistency with the empirics, we decided to deeply restructure the paper.
Former section 2 has been divided into two separate sections. New section 2 deals
with the theoretical argument the paper aims to support and has been written ex novo.
In this section we focus more directly to our argument which is twofold:
a.the importance of where learning mechanisms happen as a crucial feature for the
understanding of multi-level policy programme and, consequently,
b.the relevance of “governance learning”, i.e. the fact that actors learning is not
confined to the content of the policy, but also to procedural and governmental issues.
We discussed this points in light of the recent literature on the theme. Now, the
connection with the Dunlop-Radaelli typology has slightly changed because we argue –
and then we try to empirically trace – that the localization of policy learning has an
impact on problem tractability and actor certification, and in particular we discussed
how this latter proved to be decisive for the eventual success of the National Register
programme. In new section 3, we critically reviewed the literature on e-government with
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particular reference to implementation issues, highlighting how such programmes
entail a relevant role for governance issues which cannot be simply reduced to
centralization vs. decentralization strategies.
In section 4 of the revised manuscript, we clarify that the study is composed of a single
case study, from which has been possible to isolate three distinct outcomes, due to the
different phases of the implementation process. This choice is intrinsically related to
the multilevel nature of the programme and also consistent with the aim of investigating
the mechanism by which clear policy failures can be countervailed over time, which we
believe constitute value added for the learning literature.
We also improved the empirical section, partially restructuring section 7 to give more
emphasis to the role played by actors at the national level in coordinating an
implementation based on the diffusion of locally-developed solutions. To account for
this outcome, in the revised version of the paper we singled out more clearly two
learning-related factors:
a.The learning of national administrations essentially concerning the governance
framework of the programme
b.The diffusion of the Tuscany’s solution as a case of learning by bargaining in a quasi-
market situation (anyhow a de facto market created by the incentives posed by the
State).
The restructuring and streamlining of the empirical section not only prove more
convincingly that learning is crucial – whatever types, mechanisms, etc… - but that the
places where it happens is a relevant factor for policy effectiveness. In particular, ICT
implementation requires close cooperation between technological experts and street-
level bureaucrats (to adapt the solutions to the different users’ needs and practices, to
the public rules, etc.), which lack in the first round of the programme, but has been
experienced in two regions. Over the year, also national administrations, learned the
lesson and its implications concerning their role in coordinating the diffusion process.
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Multi-level policy implementation and the where of learning. The Case of the Information 
System for School Buildings in Italy 
 
1. Introduction 
This paper addresses the current debate on the different types, mechanisms and consequences 
of policy learning. While it is generally accepted that learning can take place based on both 
experience and lessons drawn from others (Greve 2003; Bardach 2004; Barzelay 2007), the 
more recent academic debate has shed light on the fact that policy actors may learn in different 
ways (Dunlop and Radaelli 2013). The impact of learning on policymaking has also been 
critically discussed, as learning processes may not only be paths to policy success but might 
also pave the way for failures (Dunlop 2017a and 2017b). 
This paper aims at introducing a feature that has been undermined by the literature: the 
loci of learning, or where a learning process could be improved. In other words, the 
question is whether there are, in multi-level policy implementation, specific venues that 
facilitate learning dynamics among policy actors. We argue that such a dimension is 
particularly important for the analysis of complex and multi-layered policy programmes, 
as it represent a key element for their success or failure. 
Empirically, the paper builds on an original case study about the design and implementation 
of an e-government programme in Italy. The National Register for School Buildings (Anagrafe 
Nazionale dell’Edilizia Scolastica) (hereafter referred to as NR) is an information system that 
connects bureaucracies in the policy field of primary and secondary education in Italy. The case 
is particularly telling because it covers a considerable span of time since the register’s inception 
in the late 1990s, and the register has been developed in a multilevel policy setting involving 
the national Ministry of education, twenty regional governments, local governments and school 
administrators. Over the last 20 years, the adoption of the NR passed through several stop-and-
go stages in which the original top-down design, which proved to be ineffective, was gradually 
replaced by the diffusion of some local good practices. The analysis of this case allows us to 
single out some of the mechanisms related to policy actors’ learning that account for the 
eventual effective implementation of a programme.  
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses the importance of 
localising policy learning for the study of multilevel, complex policy programmes. Section 
3 provides a brief review of the literature on the implementation of e-government policy 
programmes; it underlines the difficulties that arise in relation to both the complexity of 
the relations between ICT experts and policy makers and the general expectations of 
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automatic effectiveness associated with the introduction of ICT. Section 4 provides a 
descriptive narrative of the case study, while sections 5, 6 and 7 will analyse actors’ interactions 
in the main policy venues and will account for the policy outcomes. Section 8 consists of the 
final comments. 
 
2. Multilevel policy programmes and the ‘where’ of learning. 
This paper contributes to the literature on policy learning and its relations with policy 
failures and success. Broadly defined as “the updating of beliefs based on lived or 
witnessed experiences, analysis or social interaction” (Dunlop and Radaelli 2013, p. 599; 
also see Radaelli 2009), policy learning has always been linked to policy change, as a 
mechanism (or a set of mechanisms) capable of accounting for certain outcomes (Bennet 
and Howlett 1992; Hall 1993; May 1992). Nonetheless, the notion of learning had been 
initially (and vaguely) associated with policy success, since the positive impact of 
experience – even considered in the long term, as suggested by Weiss (1998) through the 
concept of the ‘enlightenment use’ of knowledge – has attracted the interests of scholars. 
(Gilardi and Radaelli 2012). More recently such a relation has been problematized. First, 
in reason of the flawed nature of policy success and failure (Boven and t’Hart 1996 and 
2016); in second place, some contributions suggest that the impact of negative feedbacks 
do not automatically trigger positive learning, but they can instead bring about 
pathologies to the policy process with detrimental effects on outputs and outcomes 
(Dunlop 2017a; Newman and Bird 2017; Key 2017). Little attention has been instead paid 
on the reverse path, which would mean focusing on the mechanisms by which the perverse 
effect of negative feedbacks (potential or actual) could be countervailed (Lanzara 1998). 
In particular, Dunlop (2017a) links policy learning outcomes to the idea of ‘organisational 
capacity’, understood as the stock of powers, financial resources and analytical skills that 
policy actors—particularly public administrations—might have in varying amounts. The 
characteristics of a single organization, an actor, could be sufficient to explain the 
outcomes of simple policy programmes, but will hardly account for multilevel settings. 
Indeed, the multilevel nature of policy programmes has several implications for the 
literature on learning. The most obvious is that such programmes usually involve many 
actors, belonging to both the public sector and civil society, whose behaviour usually take 
place in policy venues collocated at different layers of a given polity (Hill and Hupe 2003). 
This, in turn, has recently led scholars to focus on the impact of policy networks’ shape 
on outcomes (Howlett et al. 2017) and, from a more epistemological standpoint, to search 
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for causal mechanisms as a key to drawing lessons from the experiences of others, which 
is helpful in designing multi-actor policy implementation (Barzelay 2007; Busetti and 
Dente 2018).  
The second implication that multilevel settings bring to the analysis of policy programmes 
concerns the places where policy learning happens and their impact on outcomes. The 
literature on policy learning has thoroughly focused on the actors of learning (who), on 
what they are likely to learn (what), and on the ways (intended or not, depth, extension, 
etc.) through which the process is carried out (how) (Moyson et al. 2017, p. 166). Moreover, 
the where question has been analysed in general terms such as the micro-level (individual), 
the meso-level (groups interactions, organisations), and the macro-level (institutions). 
Little or no attention has been paid to where learning takes place in multilevel policy 
processes, meaning in which venues does learning happen. Such a theme is implicitly 
discussed in recent works which emphasized the modes of governance (Gilardi and 
Radaelli 2012) or the role of proximity between implementers and users/recipients on 
policy outcomes (Nohrstedt and Weible 2010; Busetti and Dente 2016; see also the concept 
of ‘trading zones’ in Galison 1997).  
In this paper we argue that in multilevel policy programmes actors learning is not a 
sufficient condition for policy success, since ceteris paribus a given learning process may 
or may not have a positive impact depending on which policy venues are involved and 
with which characteristics. This implies that the place where actors’ relations take place 
shapes – constitutes the essential contextual condition to trigger specific interactions that 
influence – the two dimensions affecting the learning mechanisms singled out by Dunlop 
and Radaelli (2013): actor certification and problem tractability. Both in fact do not exist 
in a vacuum and in a multilevel setting could be declined in very different way by policy 
designers depending on their causal theories about the programme to be implemented. 
More specifically, this reasoning applies to the procedural dimension of policy learning, 
initially conceptualised by Etheredge as “government learning”, by which the author 
emphasized the learning processes occurring within a given public administration (1981), 
and more recently reframed with the notion of ‘governance learning’. Whereas policy 
learning “is usually focused on learning about instruments and the content and substance 
of policy, governance learning is distinctly concerned with the procedural dimensions of 
decision-making and governance processes” (Challies et al. 2017, p. 291; see also Gilardi 
and Radaelli 2012). 
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We suggest that the failure of public programmes, and especially innovative programmes 
based on e-government solutions, can be explained not by the lack of learning but by the 
fact that learning happens in the wrong places. In fact, where learning processes happen 
is crucial in multilayered policy programmes, as the fact that certain actors are learning 
about how to effectively implement a policy has no impact if this occurs away from 
contexts where incentives and preferences allow actors to deliver the programme.  
 
3. E-government as an implementation game 
In public debate, the use of ICT solutions in government and public administration is often 
welcomed as a revolutionary process that can eliminate most of the limits normally and often 
rightly attributed to bureaucracies, such as inefficiency, ineffectiveness, lack of adaptability and 
myopia (Dunleavy and Margetts 2010 and 2015; Dunleavy 2016). However, technology does 
not automatically apply to operational contexts. Empirical investigations have revealed how 
these transformations are often far from smooth and successful (Heintze and Bretschneider 
2000), especially as actors play a crucial role in these processes. Indeed, according to Heeks 
(Heeks 2006; Heeks and Bailur 2007), the simple fact that a considerable number of the case 
studies analysed in the literature ended up being total or partial failures might be interpreted as 
an indicator of the socio-technical nature of the contexts. Unfortunately, little empirical work 
on successful cases has been attempted (Cordella and Tempini 2015).  
The implementation of e-government innovations has been more likely to encounter severe 
pitfalls and negative side effects that were not entirely envisaged in the formulation and design 
phases. Possible threats occur at different stages of the innovation process and range from 
purely technological aspects to wider organisational and policy aspects (Pardo et al. 2012). A 
literature survey by Ebrahim and Irani (2005) identified five types of barriers to the 
implementation of e-government solutions. One barrier is infrastructure, which encompasses 
all the possible issues related to technical feasibility. Another barrier is the cost of the solutions. 
From the institutional standpoint, the barrier of security and privacy regulations might 
negatively affect the optimality of e-government systems. In terms of more policy-related 
issues, policymakers may lack ICT skills and expertise, and eventually other organisational 
deficits can emerge, such as difficulties in coordinating different units or different institutional 
levels. In these last cases, collaboration between experts and policymakers is essential to foster 
learning and to guide decisions for successful solutions. 
This paper specifically addresses the last two barriers, which constitute the political and 
organisational dimension of change within the public sector and thus directly relate with 
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governance learning. This dimension can be broken down into two sub-dimensions. The first 
concerns the relationship between the public sector and the sources of knowledge and expertise, 
which are often located outside public sector boundaries. Considering the pace at which ICT 
knowledge evolves, internalising skills is almost impossible for the public sector. Conversely, 
a more viable strategy could rely on building the capacity to absorb the necessary knowledge 
and thus on structuring the organisation and recruiting the staff required to establish a dialogue 
with experts and the markets (Breznits 2007; Dunlop and Radaelli 2017a and 2017b).  
The second sub-dimension relates to the fact that technochange often depends on 
intergovernmental processes involving the interaction of several layers of government that are 
not necessarily willing to cooperate. More importantly, the implementation of ICT solutions 
within the public sector not only represents a way to develop its relationship with citizens and 
business more effectively but also is a tool to manage (and possibly improve) intergovernmental 
relations (Ebrahim and Irani 2005, p. 590), a point that has been almost totally neglected by the 
literature. A notable exception is the work of Dunleavy and Margetts (2010 and 2015), which 
focus on the potential positive impact that ICT solutions could have in integrating structures 
and processes that new public management (NPM) reforms have progressively fragmented, 
sometimes with negative effects in terms of effectiveness and control (Ling 2002; Bogdanor 
2005). Such a perspective aims at a) fostering a better coordination setting, overcoming the 
traditional organisation based on specialised silos; b) reducing the costs of ICT development; 
and c) developing platforms useful for many different services and institutional units (Dunleavy 
2016). In fact, the complexity of the policy fields might represent a severe challenge for the 
implementation of top-down programmes, as in multilevel governance settings where actors 
are often loosely coupled, resulting in unexpected fiascos. Although such a recentralising 
perspective represents a possible outcome in many cases, it is also possible that the design and 
implementation of technological change in the public sector assume a different meaning 
(Kuipers et al. 2014) as not (or not only) a tool to streamline and centralise the decisional system 
but as an instrument and a strategy to make governments and bureaucracies, which will continue 
to be located at different layers of the state structure, cooperate better. 
As suggested by Margetts and Neumann (2017), the implementation of e-government 
systems cannot be analytically captured by separate categories such as “centralisation” 
or “decentralisation” since to be effective ICT innovations in the public sphere are 
necessarily a combination of both: the central level of a polity should ideally provide 
coordination capacity and a flexible technological standard which allow an innovative 
solution scale from the bottom up. This finding gives strength to the argument concerning 
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the places where governance learning processes take place. Our claim is that the strong 
diffusion of expertise regarding ICTs allows the local development of innovations (Sørensen 
2012), especially where universities or research centres are operating and producing technicians 
for the market. This opportunity supports the hypothesis that the design of successful ICT 
solutions can find favourable arenas in local settings where more fruitful relationships among 
experts, users and policymakers can arise and where implementation of those solutions is more 
a matter of how to incentivise the development of innovation rather than the top-down execution 
of a programme. In this sense, proximity (along the centralized-decentralized continuum) 
should be interpreted as an enabling condition to foster actor certification and problem 
tractability, which have been identified as key dimensions of learning mechanisms (Dunlop 
and Radaelli 2013). In fact, proximity facilitates the exchange of knowledge among networks 
of experts, brokers, translators, and policy-makers and the adaptation of technical solutions to 
policy needs, might in fact be more feasible at the local level.  
Another hypothesis regards the capacity of local successful solutions to scale up and achieve 
national diffusion. Even using the policy learning framework, our claim is that the change of 
venue, from a local setting to a national one, will be improved by mechanisms fostering the 
involvement of actors of a superior level whose role would be that of the implementation of 
coordinating activities through which a local solution will be legitimated and diffused to the 
whole national territory. 
The considerable time span and multilayered nature of the policy programme that will be 
analysed in the following sections and that involved several actors and different policy venues 
make the case suitable to empirically trace the learning processes that might reverse a central 
policy failure and end with a success characterised by an effective ICT solution and (currently 
in progress) national diffusion (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993). The research strategy 
followed a qualitative approach based on semi-structured interviews with policymakers and on 
document analysis. The paper therefore describes micro-dynamics and mechanisms but 
aims at shedding light on meso-level learning (Dunlop 2017b, p. 7-8) by reconstructing 
specific organisational configurations associated with the outcomes.  
 
4. The case and the research design 
In the summer of 2015, Italian Minister of Education Stefania Giannini launched the NR, a 
database management system that stores information about publicly owned school buildings to 
be used for planning and investment allocation at both the national and regional levels. To date, 
the NR is a collection of 20 regional databases that have surveyed more than 42,000 buildings 
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across the country. The data concern structural features such as planimetry, rooms’ capacity, 
type of furniture, safety and energy standards and certificates, the existence of evacuation plans 
and the existence of transport connections for students. The total entries number approximately 
180 fields and are updated yearly. The system is about to be further improved with the 
implementation of a unified national data warehouse, updated in real time as schools’ owners, 
mostly municipalities and provinces, log in and provide the latest available information 
(Presidency of the Council 2017, pp. 29-30). 
The development of such an e-government solution that significantly restructures the G-2-G 
relationship in the policy field of school management had been far from smooth and faced a 
troublesome implementation punctuated by negative feedback and the fiascos of the flawed 
original programme. The original programme was launched in 1996 when a national law 
framework regulating investment in schools envisaged the construction of a unified information 
system to collect and analyse data that until that moment were exclusively on paper and in the 
hands of local governments. In cooperation with the different regional governments, the 
Ministry of Education, which had been empowered to oversee planning functions in the field 
by the same law, started to implement the system in the early 2000s. However, after some years, 
the rate of compliance dropped, and the system was declared a failure in 2009 by the Ministry 
itself. In the meanwhile, the two regional governments of Tuscany and Piedmont had 
independently developed local solutions that proved to be more effective than the national one1. 
Once the national programme was declared a failure, the Ministry gave all regional 
governments the opportunity to choose among those two solutions (some had already 
independently made the decision to do exactly that). Currently, only one of the two solutions, 
that of Tuscany, has been adopted by other regional governments and by the Ministry itself, 
and thus it has become the new operating standard for the new edition of the system, 
which will be launched in 2018 and will allow an immediate data flow from the regional 
platforms to the national one (Interview 6). 
The NR programme is analysed as a single longitudinal case study that will explain three 
distinct outcomes that are connected to three different phases of the implementation process. 
The first is the failure of the original national programme. The second concerns the success of 
the local solutions (the Piedmont and Tuscany interventions); here, success (or effectiveness) 
is measured as the ability to realize an informative system able to guarantee school directors 
                                                          
1 A third locally developed system was developed by the Region of Friuli Venezia-Giulia, but it was a mere 
adaptation of a pre-existing database management system used for a completely different purpose and has recently 
been dropped by the same regional government. 
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about the usefulness of the solutions, thus fostering their compliance with data collection 
protocols and data entry duties. The last is the revision of the national implementation 
strategy which underpinned the diffusion of one of the two local solutions nationwide, 
namely the system designed and implemented in the Tuscany Region. 
Considering a multilevel policy, this theory-building case study (to discover whether the 
‘where’ of actors’ relations triggers mechanisms related to positive, neutral or negative 
learning) is based on the reconstruction of the implementation processes at the different 
levels. The case has been selected considering its representativeness – it allows us to study 
the reasons for failures and successes based on the characteristics and relations among 
the actors involved at the different stages and levels of the implementation process (Beach 
and Pedersen 2013; Dente 2014).  
 
--- Table 1 about here --- 
 
5. The national programme 2001–2009: No learning from the top-down 
The narrative that follows is one in which failure can be connected with typical features of 
organisational capacity, understood as a lack of coordination powers and, to some extent, 
cognitive limitations of the public administrations involved. In light of the conceptualisation 
introduced by Bovens and ’tHart (1996), the policy failure described is certainly programmatic, 
as implementation outcomes had been completely inconsistent with the goals. 
The Ministry of Education started to design the register in the early 2000s. This process took 
place in two separate venues. The first involved a representative of the Ministry along with 
three educational representatives of Italian Regions and one representative each of the national 
associations of municipalities (ANCI) and provinces (UPI). This team worked on elaborating 
the information to be included in the data sheet to which local governments should have 
transferred data concerning their school institutions for the NR.  
The second involved the development of hardware and software components of the system and 
took place almost entirely within the Ministry. This task was assigned to a leading Italian ICT 
company, Engineering SpA., after a competitive tender. Signed in 2001, the contract established 
a close partnership between the two organisations, as a team from Engineering S.p.A. was 
deployed full time at the Ministry to manage the register. According to the policy actors 
interviewed, the development of the system faced no relevant budget constraints; the overall 
resources allocated amounted to Italian ₤ 20 billion (approximately €10.3 million). One third 
had been transferred to the different Regions to cover data collection costs, while the rest was 
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the financial basis for the multi-year contract between the Ministry and Engineering SpA., an 
amount that has been defined as ‘reasonable’ (Interview 1).  
The implementation of the register occurred in 2002 after an earthquake in the Molise Region 
caused the collapse of an elementary school that resulted in the death of 26 children and one 
teacher. The event inevitably highlighted the condition of school infrastructure. Therefore, the 
Ministry unit responsible for the NR gained momentum and worked closely with 
Cittadinanzattiva [Active Citizenships], a general interest group traditionally focused on the 
field of education. According to the chief of the Engineering SpA. team, “the manager 
responsible for the NR was very committed to the project and deliberately involved 
Cittadinanzattiva and accepted many of its instances” (Interview 1). 
The implementation of the system was inconclusive. The programme envisaged the creation of 
a data warehouse in each of the 20 regions where local governments were expected to upload 
the data sheets concerning the schools they owned. Later, the regional hubs would have 
transferred the data to the national data warehouse. According to all the policy actors 
interviewed, the expected outcome did not occur, even if the way in which they have defined 
the failure varied according to the role they played in the process. For Engineering SpA.’s 
operational manager, the basic problem was that the school managers “just did not upload their 
data because they had no incentives”, and the Ministry had no effective hierarchical influence 
on them. Despite the personal commitment of the Ministry’s director responsible for the NR, 
the project hardly represented a priority within the Department for Information Systems, which 
was much more focused on the human resources management information system – mainly 
because this lay in the domain of influential stakeholders such as trade unions. Recognising the 
problems in these terms, the reaction was to organise meetings in each region with the 
stakeholder to promote the project and convince them that its effective implementation would 
be in their interest due to the availability of usable data and better planning conditions. 
Therefore, Engineering SpA. distributed a codebook with the collaboration of Tuscany 
Government that contained instructions for local governments on how to collect and upload 
data. Nevertheless, such activities were very rare (a one-shot event for each region), mainly 
because they were not included in the management contract (Interview 1).  
The perspective of the interviewed regional directors is different and more articulated. They 
confirmed the lack of compliance already mentioned but also raised issues related to the 
architecture of the system, highlighting several problems in the transmission of data and, more 
importantly, revealing that there was no functioning reporting system that allowed regional and 
local government users to get back usable data concerning the school they own (Interviews 2, 
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5). Moreover, the data sheet for the collection of information had as the basic unit the ‘school’ 
which was understood as an institution and not a single building. This solution might have given 
rise (if effectively implemented) to reliability problems and ambiguities because “a school 
might well be structured in more than one building as well as one building can host more than 
one school” (Interview 3). 
The NR experiment ended in 2009. Another earthquake with fatal implications for school 
infrastructure helped put the NR at the centre of attention, even if this time the lack of data 
about buildings’ characteristics and security standards was framed as Ministry non-compliance 
with the project. This fostered a major change in the way the national administration dealt with 
the NR, which will be discussed in Section 7. 
 
6. Down-scaling the certification mechanisms: The rise of two local solutions 
While the first attempt to build the NR had been on the whole a failure, it had nonetheless 
produced some impacts at the local level. In fact, in two regions – Tuscany and Piedmont 
– local policy makers started independently to develop their own solutions.  
In Tuscany the process started in 2001, when the regional branch of the Court of Account (the 
highest public accountancy body in the country) solicited the regional governments to deploy 
the financial resources transferred by the Ministry for the data warehouse and survey activities. 
At this point, backed by the region’s executive and the head of the Education General 
Directorate, the regional official responsible for school infrastructure started to cooperate with 
the Provincial Government of Pisa – in particular with its School Observatory, a policy unit 
which had experience in dealing with the governance of education – through participatory and 
deliberative venues including the main stakeholders of the field such as deans, teachers and 
families’ representatives. This unit had been developing information systems for education 
management since the late 1990s. According to the regional project manager: “We knew that 
there [in Pisa’s Observatory] they were experimenting [with] innovative solutions, such as the 
Student Register, a monitoring system to track students’ performance throughout their 
educational paths, that they created in 1996 … They knew what we needed and we thought that 
collaborating with them could have been more promising than involving the Region’s 
Information System Department” (Interview 2). 
The organisational resources to carry out the project in the Provincial Government of Pisa were 
far from abundant. Apart from the programmer, who was part of the province’s Information 
System Department, the only full-time members of the team were a teacher working on a 
voluntary basis and two conscientious objectors, an architect and a computer technician, who 
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opted to serve the province instead of joining the army. Therefore, the regional register was 
very ‘primitive’ at the beginning, but “it had the merit of embodying a ‘philosophy’ … the 
mission was of being useful for the different types of stakeholders involved” (Interview 5). The 
main difference between the NR and the register designed in Tuscany was the engagement of 
the final users, which partially overlapped with the duties of the actors responsible for collecting 
data. Making them aware of the potential benefits of complying with the programme was key. 
For example, a dean who has access to the platform can download safety certificates for his 
school that he needs once a year; thus, he can avoid direct interaction with the responsible 
office. Moreover, the multi-access nature of the platform is vital for the quality of the data, as 
the same dean in the example should have a direct interest in checking that the certificate he 
needs is the latest version and if it is not, he would signal the responsible authority to update 
the field. 
The system created in this context solved some of the implementation problems that the national 
level failed to tackle. Despite being better crafted and designed based on the needs of the 
stakeholders, the system was still local and its diffusion within Tuscany was not so easy, as 
“not all the territories could take advantage of the expertise developed by Pisa’s School 
Observatory in terms of dialog with stakeholders” (Interview 2). With the aim of encouraging 
compliance as much as possible, the Regional Government institutionalised its partnership with 
the Provincial Government of Pisa, making it the operational branch of the project. This strategy 
pushed the two objectors working for the province of Pisa to set up a spin-off, the company 
Soluxioni Srl, as they had no chance of being stably employed by the administration. This team 
started to diffuse the data collection methodology across the region in a way that would have 
been unmanageable for a top-down national implementer such as the Ministry.  
The solution developed by the Piedmont Region came out in 2005, immediately after the NR 
was launched. The regional project manager admitted that the decision to develop an 
independent system “had been taken soon after I came back from the NR start-up meeting at 
the Ministry. I immediately realised that their project would have problems in terms of 
compliance. There wasn’t any serious methodology to involve local governments and make 
them comply” (Interview 4). Therefore, the Regional Government organised several meetings 
with local government directors and personnel responsible for school infrastructure to instruct 
them about the project’s mission and how they should enter data about their schools. “We cared 
of giving them some symbolic rewards for their participation such as certificates of attendance, 
which have been highly appreciated” (Ibidem). However, to make local governments comply, 
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the Region has fixed correct data entry as a necessary condition for them to be eligible for 
funding. 
From the technical standpoint, the system was implemented by CSI, an ICT company directly 
owned by the Region with a 39 percent stake. “It was an obliged choice, since everything has 
to do with ICT in the region must be assigned to that company” (Interview 4), but the system 
proved to work well, particularly as far as the quality of data is concerned. Different from 
Tuscany’s application, that of Piedmont is highly centralised. To be correctly uploaded, each 
record concerning a school building must pass the validation of the regional office. This 
function is based on a system that automatically controls the internal consistency of the data 
entered. If more than five anomalies are detected, the data entry is automatically blocked, at 
which point “we intervene to help the local governments responsible to solve the problem” 
(Interview 4; Regione Piemonte 2004).  
Even though Piedmont’s system obtained excellent results in terms of coverage (99.9% of the 
region’s buildings have been surveyed) and consistency of collected data, limits have arisen in 
the technical development of the system and the partnership with CSI. It has been judged that 
the technical development cannot be improved further with ad hoc maintenance: “since 
regulations concerning schools’ infrastructures change continuously, the cost of up-grading 
each single field of the register is becoming not manageable … Even because of its higher 
security standards [the Piedmont system] is much more rigid than that developed by the others 
[Tuscany]” (Interview 4). Moreover, the relationship between the regional office and CSI is not 
perfect in terms of managing the system because the company “often changes the operational 
personnel working on the register and this brings lack of knowledge” (Interview 4). 
 
---- Table 2 about here --- 
 
7. The diffusion of the Tuscany system: A case of ‘intelligence of democracy’ 
As mentioned above, the launch of the NR occurred in 2015. The disclosure of the data 
concerning more than 42,000 buildings across the country was the last event in a process that 
altered the inertia of the Ministry after the repeated shortcomings of the original project. In 
2009, a new earthquake that had a severe impact on school infrastructure gave new media 
salience to the NR issue. This time2, unlike what happened in 2002, Cittadinanzattiva blamed 
                                                          
2 In 2012 and later in 2016, two new earthquakes in the Emilia-Romagna Region and in the Marche and Umbria 
Regions fixed the issue of the agenda as an important issue in the national and regional political spheres: “The 
political focus on these issues has increased sensibly… there have been lots of question times at the regional 
Assembly raised or pushed by stakeholders’ inputs” (Interview 3). 
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the Ministry for years of inactivity. This context pushed the head of the Ministry to implement 
a reshuffling so that in the new organisational chart, the NR issue was structured in a dedicated 
general direction, whereas in the past – according to our interviewees (4, 5) – the powers over 
NR was ambiguously attributed and the programme suffered from lack of support.  
In 2009, the Ministry of Education radically shifted its implementation strategy towards 
a bottom-up approach aimed at taking advantage of the two locally developed working 
solutions. As a first move, it declared the uselessness of the NR project and invited the regional 
governments to adopt one of the existing solutions, thus benefiting from the legislative 
framework on the ‘ICT re-use’ strategy in the public sector (Digital Administration Code, §69 
– Law-decree n. 80/2005), allowing each regional administration to request the software 
developed by the Tuscany or Piedmont Regions for free. The only costs would have been those 
associated with management services to adapt the solution and eventually to develop it. At the 
same time, the role of the Ministry changed from that of a top-down implementer to that of a 
coordinator/manager of the network, thus fostering a collaborative governance arena (see 
Sørensen 2012).  
The new strategy had momentum in February 2014 when the Ministry, regional 
governments and municipalities reached an agreement on the implementation process. More 
specifically, the national strategy refocused on fixing incentives for local governments to collect 
and update the information in the new system. Basically, the main emergent strategy – already 
struck in 2011 in a Ministry–Regions deal – linked eligibility for receiving EU and national 
investment funds with compliance with the NR (Presidency of the Council 2014). Thus, the 
necessity to manage the implementation of the unprecedented amount of resources 
coming from the State and the European Investment Bank (EIB) founds led the newly 
appointed government of Matteo Renzi – who fixed the education field as a priority in his 
political agenda – to establish a task force on school infrastructure within the Presidency of 
the Council: ItaliaSicura. To correctly monitor the financial resources, ItaliaSicura found that 
the NR could have represented a valid policy instrument to steer the process (Interview 1). The 
impulse of ItaliaSicura and the presence of an undersecretary of Education particularly 
close to the Prime minister created the favourable conditions for the Ministry of Education 
to implement the programme: such a new political setting “created competition between the 
school infrastructures’ General Direction of the Ministry and the Presidency and competition, 
in turn, boosted change” (Interview 4)3. ItaliaSicura had a crucial role in persuading the 
                                                          
3 The role of political oversight for administrative learning has been discussed by Craft (2017). 
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Minister of Education to take advantage of the two locally developed solutions (Interview 
6; Interview 4).  
At that time, a few regional governments had already adopted the system developed for 
the Tuscany Region by Soluxioni and thanks to the new national governance structure 
other regional governments adopted the system as well – with the obvious exception of 
Piedmont that chose to keep its own. Why Tuscany’s rather than Piedmont’s system was 
adopted represents an interesting research question that has to do with the mechanisms by which 
an emergent bottom-up policy programme with no relevant financial or technical constraints 
could have been implemented with some success. The governance architecture and the basic 
characteristics of the two solutions helped answer this question, shedding light on the 
mechanisms that affect the implementation of the programme as a result of the diffusion 
process.  
The interviews we conducted univocally highlight that the system developed by the Piedmont 
Region was unattractive because of the higher costs compared to the system developed by the 
Tuscany Region. For instance, the licenses for the Piedmont database management system cost 
€15,000, whereas those for the Tuscany system cost €2,000 (Interview 5). A further source of 
costs was represented by the management of the register, that is, a region might not be willing 
or capable of providing their own internal resources and in this case also the Tuscany solution 
proved to be better. The ‘cost argument’ could certainly be assumed to be a simple and trivial 
explanation, but the technical characteristics of the two solutions reflect more complex 
configurations of actors and preferences.  
As mentioned earlier, the Tuscany solution emerged from an operational partnership that the 
regional Education Department directors established with Pisa’s School Observatory that took 
advantage of the commitment of few but highly motivated personnel at the provincial 
administration, who developed the Regional Register by building on some existent ICT skills 
applied to the education sector. When the system became more effective thanks to the 
increasing compliance of local regional governments, it started to attract the interest of the 
heads of education departments of other regions: “The interest of our colleagues increasingly 
rose since, at a certain point in our inter-governmental meetings in Rome, we started to have 
data on buildings that they simply don’t have… So regions more committed to the Register’s 
issue asked us to have our own system and we managed to organise the technology transfer 
directly involving the Pisa crew” (Interview 2). In this way, regional governments such as 
Liguria, Marche and Emilia-Romagna adopted the system between 2008 and 2009 before the 
Ministry started to play its coordinating role. In this period, the two fixed-term employees of 
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Pisa province established a company to deliver NR servicing and thus started to become the 
crucial partner for all the regions starting to adopt the Tuscany register system. To date, this 
company is still virtually the sole player in a market created de facto by the new course of the 
NR programme. In fact, when in 2016 the Emilia-Romagna Regional Government announced 
a competitive tender for servicing the regional register, there was a sole player attending the 
procedure. Despite such a monopolistic context, however, Soluxioni is providing services “at 
a reasonable value for money” (Interview 3). The same company in fact seems to pay particular 
attention to offering affordable basic services and is very flexible in accepting customisations 
(Interview 5), thus building a market strategy aimed at creating a niche that is hard for 
newcomers to enter.  
The evidence collected on the Piedmont system and its non-diffusion depicts a completely 
different design environment. In this sense, the deployment of more expensive technologies 
could be explained by the scale of the company and by the fact that this was based on a rationale 
that is not aimed at reducing costs for every single programme but at increasing its size and 
defending its technological core. Also, the Piedmont solution raised interest among different 
regional governments, especially in the South of Italy, but the management contract CSI 
proposed to them was considerably more expensive than that of the main competitor: “CSI has 
1,000 employees, Soluxioni only 12… They’re much more flexible” (Interview 4). This point 
is indirectly supported by an observation of the Tuscany Region’s directors about the 
development of the project that “could have been so smooth because we had the possibility to 
by-pass the Region’s ICT Department and by the fact that it did not exercise any veto to contrast 
our Register project” (Interview 2). In the case of Piedmont, if the involvement of the best 
certified expert in the region did not create a hurdle for the design and implementation of the 
solution, it certainly represented an unfavourable condition for its diffusion. Tuscany’s directors 
(confirmed by interviewees) were very proactive with other regional governments and sent 
Pisa’s operating crew to demonstrate the system and offer assistance, while the Piedmont 
managers had a far less open attitude (Interviews 1, 3). 
In 2016, Soluxioni became a subcontractor of the multinational Hewlett Packard (which is 
currently the Information systems’ general contractor for the Ministry of Education) to 
realise the national data warehouse. In a first draft of the new architecture that aimed to create 
a more unified system, the Tuscany director proposed to go beyond the regional hubs and create 
a single data warehouse that could be hosted in that regional institution and that could be 
managed by Soluxioni. This proposal was immediately rejected by the Region of Piedmont, 
which wanted to defend its own system and peculiarities in terms of secure access and data 
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validation, although the persistence of regional hubs might hinder economies of scale 
(Interview 4). 
 
8. Discussion and conclusion 
The study about the design and implementation of the NR presented three distinctive outcomes 
derived from three different phases of the implementation process.  The first is the failure of 
the original programme pursued by the Ministry of Education. The second is the rise of effective 
local solutions, such as those developed by the Regions of Tuscany and Piedmont. The third is 
the diffusion of the Tuscany solution and its adoption as a standard by almost all the other 
regional governments and by the Ministry itself for the implementation of the national data 
warehouse (this latter is still in process).  
In light of the interpretation of these outcomes based on learning mechanisms and contextual 
features such as the localisation of learning processes throughout a multilevel 
implementation structure, it is worth noting that the case study allows controlling for some 
of the possible implementation barriers. In fact, the financial resources allocated for realising 
the original programme, although it failed, have been judged to be adequate, while the 
development and diffusion of the local solutions did not benefit by ad-hoc funding. The same 
goes for the technical feasibility that was not mentioned as a serious hurdle by the implementers 
of the first NR, while the in-house development of the Tuscany solution testifies per se that the 
system was not intrinsically too complex. Moreover, regulative barriers, such as security and 
privacy laws, that often constitute a hurdle were not a serious issue in this case, as the data are 
not sensitive, without privacy issues.  
The first two outcomes, the failure of the original NR and the rise of two functioning local 
systems, shed light on the role that the localisation of learning might have on the 
certification of actors. Here, what emerges as relevant is not the degree of experts’ 
legitimation in terms of technical competence (Radaelli and Dunlop 2013) – higher also in 
the first phase of the NR – but rather, the fact that local experts had been more capable 
of bringing about usable knowledge, because of their proximity with users and the rich 
exchange of information regarding the micro-characteristics of the instruments and 
procedures. In fact, the failure of the NR stands out primarily as the inability for the 
implementers (mainly national) to involve local governments in the programme and make them 
comply with it. However, local solutions could have been carried out by downscaling the 
certification process, thus allowing grass-roots experts the possibility of building on locally 
crafted ICT solutions that are very seldom primitive, as in the case of the solution developed 
17 
 
by the Region of Tuscany. This finding contributes to the literature highlighting the importance 
of learning venues when policies are organised in a multilevel setting. 
What explains the successful diffusion of one of the two local solutions is the combination of 
two elements. First and consistently with the literature on ICT implementation in 
government (Margetts and Naumann 2017), the solution designed in Tuscany regional 
sub-system proved to be much more flexible, both as a technology and management 
system. Such a feature, in turn, derives to some extent from the loosely coupled environment 
in which the solution was developed without any substantial backing from the regional 
Information System Department. More specifically, what occurred was coordination among the 
regional directors who promoted their solution nationally—incidentally creating a greenfield 
market—and Pisa’s Observatory spin-off, which profited from that emerging market. This 
configuration therefore produced an application that is more attractive for new users because it 
is easier to adapt to new contexts and costs less to service. Conversely, the Piedmont solution 
proved to be more rigid exactly as a consequence of the hierarchical subsystem in which 
was designed. 
The second element that explains the successful diffusion of the Tuscany solution – and 
through it the effective implementation of the whole programme – is the new strategy 
adopted by the Ministry. This emerged as governance learning based on previous negative 
feedback, in which national policymakers’ causal assumption about the implementation 
process has been completely reversed: National departments eventually recognized the 
existence of local working solutions and acted to create the institutional framework to 
allow them to scale up fixing incentives for regional and local governments to comply with 
the programme. Also, such a diffusion process is consistent with the “government as a 
platform” literature, namely with the idea of a mix of centralizing coordination and 
standardisation functions while allowing market actors to develop working solutions 
(Margetts and Naumann 2017). Moreover, this case shed light on the possibility of learning 
by means of bargaining and social interaction, also associated with Lindblom’s idea of the 
‘intelligence of democracy’ (Dunlop and Radaelli 2013). To this regard, nonetheless, the case 
analysed – which to date represents a case of successful conversion of a persistent policy 
failure – may hide the seeds of new pitfalls. In fact, the funding opportunities for attracting 
investment in school infrastructure might represent for local government an incentive to enter 
data that do not relate to the real conditions of buildings in order to maximise the possibility of 
gaining resources. In this sense, there might be the incentive for the diffusion of an application 
with lower quality standards. This represent the current challenge for the national 
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administrations: the Ministry and the Presidency of the Council. On the one side in fact 
the NR implementation profited by a momentum created by the higher salience that the 
policy issue has obtained since 2009, mostly thanks to new financial resources for 
investment; the flip side of such a story is that such a politicization might not be 
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Table 1. Timeline 
1996 Law 23/1996 gives planning power to regions in the area of education 
infrastructures. Scheduled the construction of a National Register for School 
Buildings. 
1997–8 The task force for the NR consisting of representatives of the Ministry, three regions 
and local government associations takes office. 
1999–
2001 
Education directors from the region of Toscana start a dialog with the Schools’ 
Observatory of the province of Pisa to develop a regional register. 
2001 The Ministry selected Engineering S.p.A. as the hardware and software provider and 
operational manager of the system. 
Funds are transferred to regions to create the regional hubs and collect data.  
2002 Earthquake in Molise 
2002, fall Pisa’s task force trains local regional governments.  
2003, fall The first survey of the Toscana region is completed. 
2004 The NR is officially launched.  
2005 The region of Piedmont developed its own register in partnership with CSI, its own 
ICT company. 
2008 The region of Liguria entered into an agreement with Toscana and the province of 
Pisa to adopt their solution.  
2009 Earthquake in Abruzzo 
The Ministry officially declared the NR project expired and invited regions to adopt 
the existing local solutions. 
2009–11 Eight regions reached a deal with the region of Toscana and the province of Pisa. 
2011 The Ministry set incentives for regions to build and update their own registers. 
2011–15 Most of the regions adopted the Toscana solution and outsourced regional register 
management to Soluzioni S.R.L. 
2016 An agreement was reached to use the system developed by the Toscana region for the 
national data warehouse. 
Hewlett Packard, the main partner of the Ministry for Information Systems, 
subcontracted the new NR project to Soluzioni S.R.L. 




Table 2. Comparison of the main positive and negative feedback regarding the two solutions 
Solution Positive feedback  Negative feedback 
Toscana Flexibility/adaptability 
of the system 
Potential lack of control 
in the data entry process 
Piemonte Data consistency Rigidity/low adaptability 
of the system 
Source: Author compilation. 
Table
